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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY,

Case No. 950720-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
The state addresses Defendant/Appellant Christopher
Cheeney's ("Cheeney") challenges to the constitutionality of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) on two basic grounds: the state
asserts Cheeney's challenges were not preserved (or were waived)
in the trial court; and the state asserts the statute is
sufficiently clear and workable to overcome the constitutional
challenges, yet strains to identify how a violation of the
statute is established -- whether it is (i) under a strict
liability standard or (ii) with evidence that the defendant had
the culpable mental state to act in concert with two or more
persons in the commission of the underlying offense.

The tension

between the standards underscores a basic vagueness problem with
the statute.
POINT I. THE STATE'S ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES EMPHASIZE
THE AMBIGUITY OF SECTION 76-3-203.1.
A. THE STATE'S INTERPRETATION OF "IN CONCERT CONDUCT"
UNDER A STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD CREATES AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION.
Under Section 76-3-203.1, a defendant's penalty is enhanced
for certain predicate offenses if the defendant committed the
offense(s) "in concert with two or more persons."

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1) (a) (1995).

According to the state, a bright

line test or strict liability standard is applied under that
provision, relieving the prosecutor of the burden of proving the
defendant had the culpability to commit the predicate offense
with others.

The state relies on State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497

(Utah 1989) (enhanced penalty for committing offense within 1000
feet of public school), State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah
1994) (state is not required to prove culpability of other
alleged actors under gang enhancement), and McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (enhanced penalty for visible
possession of a firearm), in support of that proposition.

Those

cases are inapposite.
In Moore, 782 P.2d at 4 97, the defendant was charged and
convicted of distribution of a controlled substance for value
within 1000 feet of a public school in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953 as amended) and was given an enhanced

sentence pursuant

to the strict

subsection (5)(a)-(d)-1

liability

provisions

set forth in

To prove the distance between the

location of the crime and the public school, the state was
required to employ a bright line test, which took into
consideration only the objectively measured distance from the
location where the act occurred to the public school grounds,
Moore, 782 P.2d at 502-03.

Obviously, such a bright line test

1

Subsection (5) (d) states: "It is not a defense to a prosecution
under this subsection that the actor mistakenly believed . . . that the
location where the act occurred was not as described in subsection (5) (a)
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as described
in subsection (5)(a)." Moore, 782 P.2d at 504.
2

cannot be applied under Section 76-3-203.1; "in concert" conduct
is not a theory susceptible to the tidy laws of geometry.

In

addition, under Utah law, the strict liability standard applies
only when the statute defining the offense expressly so states,
as reflected in Section 58-37-8.

See State v. Elton, 680 P.2d

727, 728-29 n.3 (Utah 1984).
According to the state, the court in Alvarez, 872 P.2d at
450, "implicitly rejected the proposition that in order for
Utah's [Section 76-3-203.1] 'in concert' enhancement to apply,
the defendant's actions in concert with others must be attended
by any mens rea besides that required for the predicate offense - in that case, intentional murder."

(Brief of Appellee, dated

April 2, 1996 ("Br. Appellee"), at 13.)
incorrect.

That assertion is

The Alvarez court expressly rejected the proposition

that persons

with

whom the criminal

defendant

"acted

in

concert

must be parties to the offense . . . and possess the [culpable]
mental state required for that offense." Alvarez, 872 P.2d at
450.

The court specifically recognized that the defendant's

intent to commit a crime "in concert" is determined "by his own
mental state," id., after all, the defendant suffers the enhanced
penalty if "in concert" conduct is established.

The state would

have this Court construe Alvarez as the last word on "in concert"
conduct; however, it is the starting place.

The logical

extension of Alvarez is to require the state to prove that the
defendant

specifically

intended

and planned

to commit the

predicate offense "in concert" with two or more persons.
3

To its credit, the state recognized that McMillan, 477 U.S.
at 79, is not the last word on due process rights afforded a
defendant when considering the state's chosen course of defining
crimes and prescribing penalties.

"[W]hile the Court in McMillan

acknowledged that a situation might arise wherein due process law
would require a court to disregard a statutory disclaimer of
intent to create a separate offense, it found no reason to do so
in that case."

(Br. Appellee at 9.)

In fact, the Supreme Court

in McMillan recognized "there are constitutional limits to the
State's power in [defining crimes and prescribing penalties]; in
certain limited circumstances [In re] Winship's reasonable-doubt
requirement applies to facts not formally identified as elements
of the offense charged."
added). 2

McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86 (emphasis

Section 76-3-203.1 is one of the McMillan limited

As set forth in note 5 of Cheeney's opening brief, the Court in
McMillan, recognized the following: Before imposing the enhanced firearm
penalty, the trial court was required under the Pennsylvania statute to
consider evidence presented at trial and additional evidence offered by
either party that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the
commission of the felony offense. The trial court "simply took one
factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on
punishment -- the instrumentality used in committing a violent felony -and dictated the precise weight to be given that factor if the
instrumentality is a firearm." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-90. Like the
statute in Moore, 782 P.2d at 497, the Pennsylvania provision required
the fact finder to consider a simple proposition -- whether the physical
property of a firearm was in the defendant's possession.
A finding of "in concert" conduct does not lend itself to such
simple propositions. Thus, a workable standard must be superimposed to
ensure fairness and due process.
In addition, unlike "visible possession of a firearm", "in concert"
conduct is not an aggravating factor traditionally considered in Utah for
enhancement purposes. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25.1 (1995),
a juvenile shall be bound over and held to answer criminal charges as an
adult in district court unless the juvenile court judge finds certain
conditions are met, including "that if the offense was committed with one
or more other persons, the juvenile appears to have a lesser degree of
(continued...)
4

circumstances -- the Court should disregard the statutory
disclaimer that Section 76-3-203.1 does not create a separate
offense, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5) (a) (1995), since the
phrase "in concert" must be construed to require proof of a
culpable mental state.
In a separate phase of its strict-liability-standard
argument, the state claims it is "illogical" to engraft a mens
rea

element into the statute because Section 76-3-203.1 requires

"a mens

rea

of at least recklessness."

(Br. Appellee at 12.)

The state apparently is arguing the following: unless an offense
specifically defines the mens

rea

that must be proven, the

"mental state is at least recklessness" (id. (the state cites to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1995)));

Cheeney has asked this Court

to superimpose a specific intent element of "knowing" conduct,
"unity of purpose" or "design" to prove "in concert" conduct (id.
at 11); because recklessness is not a sufficient mens
Cheeney's request is "illogical."

(Id. at 12.)

rea,

The state's

disjointed argument is misplaced.
Consistent with this Court's duties to ensure fairness in
the criminal code and to promote justice, a specific intent
element of "purpose", "conscious action", "intent", and
2

(. ..continued)
culpability than the co-defendants."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a25.1 (3) (b) (ii) (1995).
In that context, the "in concert" conduct
provision serves to save the juvenile from being subjected to the harsher
sentences that are handed down in the adult system. Likewise, the Utah
Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule, a copy of which is attached as Addendum "1",
identifies the traditional mitigating/aggravating circumstances considered by Utah courts in determining sentences. Of the circumstances identified, the following clearly infers that the defendant's part in concerted
activity is relevant: whether "offender acted under strong provocation."
An affirmative answer is considered in mitigation of the sentence.
5

"knowledge" must be superimposed where necessary, as reflected in
State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1045-46 (Utah 1984).

In that

case the Utah Supreme Court considered the second degree murder
statute, which states an actor has committed "criminal homicide"
if one of four alternative conditions exists.

The third

alternative, the depraved indifference provision, stated:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second
degree if the actor: . . .
(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life, [ ] engaged in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another and
thereby causes the death of another; . . . .
Id.

Because the provision did not specify a particular mental

state, id. ("reference to 'depraved indifference' does not denote
a subjective mental state"), the court superimposed the
appropriate culpable mental state:

Since depraved indifference
second degree murder does
not expressly
specify a particular
mental state,
the
culpable mental state required by the statute must be
as provided in Sec. 76-2-102: "Every offense
not
involving
strict
liability
shall require a culpable
mental state, and when the definition
of the
offense
does not specify a culpable mental state,
intent,
knowledge, or recklessness
shall suffice
to
establish
criminal responsibility."
We must therefore
determine
which of these three mental states is superimposed on
the depraved indifference
provision by Sec.
76-2-102.
This effort is prescribed by our statutory duty to
construe the provisions of the Criminal Code "according
to the fair import of their terms to promote justice
and to effect the . . . general purposes of section 761-104" to " [d]efine adequately the conduct and mental
state which constitute each offense" and to
"[p]rescribe penalties which are proportionate to the
seriousness of offenses . . . ." Sees. 76-1-106; 76-1104 (2) & (3) .
At the outset, we rule out "recklessness." . . . [That
term was deleted by amendment from an earlier enactment
of the statute. The deletion "makes it clear that
reckless conduct is not sufficient to prove the offense
6

of murder in the second degree."]
The context of the depraved indifference provision
persuades us to rule out "intent" as the culpable
mental state. . . . [The reading of "intentionally"
into the statute would transform second degree murder
into conduct that would constitute only manslaughter or
negligent homicide.]
In contrast to the two unacceptable alternatives, the
third mental state specified by Sec. 76-2-102,
"knowledge," fits perfectly into the sense of Sec. 765-203(1) (c) . It is clear from the structure, purpose,
and history of the depraved indifference provision that
the required culpable mental state (which we hold to be
"knowledge") refers to the nature of the actor's conduct or to the circumstance surrounding it, or both; it
does not refer to the result produced by that conduct.
Thus, under our interpretation, the culpable mental
state prescribed by statute for depraved indifference
homicide is the sensible requirement that the defendant
acted with knowledge that his conduct created a grave
risk of death to another.
Id. at 1045-47 (emphasis added and citations omitted); see also
Spitz v. Municipal Court of City of Phoenix, 621 P.2d 911 (Ariz.
1980) (court will adopt criminal intent element unless
legislature has stated strict liability standard); Exotic Coins,
Inc. v. Beacom, 699 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1985) (legislative silence on
element of intent is not to be construed as an indication that no
culpable mental state is required for violation to be proved).
Consistent with Fontana, the inclusion of a culpable mental
state, such as "unity of purpose", "design" between the defendant
and the two or more other persons, "conscious action", "intent",
and "knowledge," is a sensible requirement for proving "in
concert" conduct.

As set forth in Appellant's Brief, sister

jurisdictions, which the state rejects as "nonbinding"
Appellee at 12), require such a showing.
7

(Br.

(Brief of Appellant,

dated February 16, 1996 ("Br. Appellant") at 17.)
Indeed, this Court looked to sister state law in a civil
case for assault and battery where proof of joint liability, i.e.
"in concert" conduct, was in issue.

In D.D.Z. v. Molerway

Freight Lines, Inc., 880 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this
court ruled that joint liability could not be proved against
joint defendants based on their mere presence at the time and
place of the battery.

Rather, the plaintiff must show "in

concert" conduct, i.e. "common design," or that the joint
defendants provided encouragement or assistance to others.

Id.

(citing Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822, 823 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979);
Restatement (2d) of Torts § 876 (Persons Acting in Concert)); see
also, Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 293 P.2d 700, 702, 709
(Utah 1956) (Jones and Wade, JJ., in separate opinions
recognizing that concerted action is shown if preconceived common
design and purpose exist);

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1995)

(Conspiracy -- "a person is guilty of conspiracy when he,
intending that conduct constituting a crime be preformed, agrees
with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of
such conduct and any one of them commits an overt act in
pursuance of the conspiracy . . . " ) .
"Intent", "purpose" and "knowledge," to design, scheme and
plan fit perfectly into the sense of § 76-3-203.1.

It is clear

from the structure, purpose, and use of the phrase "in concert"
conduct that the state should be required to prove such a
culpable mental state (in addition to that which must be proved
for the predicate offense) before Section 76-3-203.1 may be
8

applied to enhance a penalty.

Any other conclusion would create

a strict liability presumption

that the actors consciously and

intentionally acted together, which presumption has long since
been condemned as inappropriate and unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court.

See McFarland v. American Sugar

Rfcr. Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916) (cited in McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87).
B. THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO
SUPERIMPOSE A SPECIFIC INTENT ELEMENT INTO THE STATUTE.
In a half-hearted attempt to address the issues raised as a
result of the ambiguity of the statue, the state asserts, "[E]ven
if this Court accepted Cheeney's argument that the 'in concert'
enhancement requires a separate mens

rea

from the predicate

offense, it would not follow that such mens
by full trial-type procedures."

rea

can only be found

(Br. Appellee at 14.)

As a

prelude to that assertion, the state admits that in order to
create a substantive offense the statute must contain a mens

rea

element (id. at 11 and 12), and that "trial-type" safeguards
"must be employed if
offense."

section 76-3-203.1 creates a substantive

(Id. at 9.)

Thus, "if this Court accepted Cheeney's

argument that the 'in concert' enhancement requires a separate
mens

rea

from the predicate offense" (id. at 14), the state must

concede that such an element (together with the actus

rea:

the

commission of the underlying offense and the existence of "two or
more persons") creates a substantive offense mandating use of
"trial-type" safeguards.

(Id. at 9, 11, and 12.)

The state next asserts that because "[c]riminal courts
routinely find facts [1] necessary for the admission of evidence
9

without jury assistance, and [2] by proof standards below the
'reasonable doubt' standard" (Br. Appellee at 14) ,3 it is not
necessary to treat a mens
differently.
1-501

rea

element in a sentencing provision

The state fails to explain how Utah Code Ann. § 76-

(1995) (a defendant is presumed innocent until each element

of the offense "is proved beyond a reasonable doubt", and
"element of the offense" means: "the culpable mental state
required") squares with that proposition.

The state also fails

to identify how a Section 76-3-203.1 proceeding is analogous to a
pretrial proceeding concerning the admissibility of evidence.
(Compare § 76-3-203.1 to laws referenced in note 3, supra.)
Sentencing laws analogous to Utah's gang-enhancement statute
include the dangerous weapon enhancement, the habitual criminal
statues, and the aggravating circumstances that must be proved in
a capital case.

Utah law provides for a jury determination and

proof beyond a reasonable doubt in connection with those

The state has cited to the following laws and principles to show
that courts routinely find facts by proof below the reasonable doubt
standard (Br. Appellee at 14-15):
(1) Rule 104, Utah Rules of Evidence, which requires the court
to
determine
preliminary
fact
questions
"concerning
the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence";
(2) The proposition that the court must determine the
voluntariness of a confession as a preliminary question relevant to
the admissibility into evidence of the confession, State v. Hinton,
680 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1984) (citing Lego v. Twomev, 404 U.S. 477
(1972) (the Sixth Amendment right to a jury does not change the
normal rule that the admissibility of evidence is a question for the
court rather than the jury)); and
(3) The propositions embodied in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3)
that the "existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of
the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of the
evidence."
It is fundamental jurisprudence that trial courts are the exclusive
finders of fact with regard to such preliminary evidentiary and
jurisdictional issues.

10

enhancements and aggravators.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203

(Supp. 1995) (dangerous weapon enhancement); Utah Code Ann. § 768-1001, et seq. (1995) (habitual criminal statutes); State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 577-80, 585-88, 591 (Utah 1987) (Stewart,
Durham, and Zimmerman, JJ., in separate opinions, collectively
holding that aggravating circumstances are elements of the crime
which the jury must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt).
Section 76-3-203.1 serves a purpose similar to them.

The same

right to a jury and heightened standard of proof should apply.
Because the legislature has written those safeguards out of the
statute, it must be stricken as unconstitutional.
Similarly, the state asserts that "because Section 76-3203.1 is a sentencing statute only, the procedure by which it
applies is relaxed."

(Br. Appellee at 15.)

However, once the

specific intent element is read into the statute, Utah law
entitles the defendant to the presumption of innocence and to a
jury on that element.
(1995).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) and (2)

Whether Section 76-3-203.1 is viewed as a "sentencing

statute only" (Br. Appellee at 15) or a separate offense, the
defendant is entitled to more process than that which is due in
traditional sentencings and provided in the statute.

Because the

legislature has denied a defendant that due process, the statute
is unconstitutional.

(See Br. Appellant at 31-36.)

POINT II. THE STATE'S OPPOSITION TO THE VAGUENESS
CHALLENGE LOOSES STEAM IN THE WAKE OF ITS INABILITY TO
DEFINE HOW "IN CONCERT" CONDUCT MUST BE PROVED.
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A. POINT ONE OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF ACKNOWLEDGES THE
VAGUENESS ISSUES THAT EXIST IN SECTION 76-3-203.1 WITH
THE PHRASE "IN CONCERT."
In Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 461, the Utah Supreme Court
determined that acting "in concert" does not require the state to
prove that the persons involved in the criminal conduct had the
same mental state as the defendant. " [T]hree persons can be
parties to the same criminal conduct and each have a different
mental state."

Id.

The ruling does not address how "in concert"

conduct must be proved against the defendant.4

(See Point I,

4

The state asserts Cheeney's challenge on vagueness grounds lacks
merit because the statute was not vague "as applied to him."
(Br.
Appellee at 20.)
In addition the state claims, "Cheeney's coperpetrators were neither unidentified nor uncharged; Cheeney himself
identified them when he confessed to police, and both co-perpetrators
were charged (R. 8, 12)." (Br. Appellee at 20.) Those assertions are
incorrect.
In the lower court proceedings, Cheeney appeared at sentencing,
represented by counsel, and the matter of his sentence was subjected to
adversarial testing. (R. 109-30.) For whatever reason, the state failed
to present evidence concerning the existence of co-defendants or
uncharged other actors.
(See R. 109-30.)
During colloquy on the
conditional plea, and as a condition of that plea, Cheeney was required
to acknowledge that the elements of the charged offenses were satisfied,
including the elements of 76-3-203.1.
(See R. 115-16, 125.)
Specifically, the trial court in this matter asked Cheeney whether he
engaged in the crime in question with "one or more persons additionally"
(R. 125) . Although the prosecutor attempted to correct the trial court
(id.), it is not clear that the trial court adopted the correction.
(Id.) Thus, the record does not contain a clear admission on the part
of Cheeney that the pled offenses were committed "in concert" with two
or more persons. In addition, during sentencing, the trial court made
occasional references to only one other person, Cheeney's "friend, if not
co-gang member, Rasmussen." (R. 142.) The evidence is insufficient to
support a finding that two or more other actors were involved in the
offenses pled in this case.
The total of what was before the judge concerning in concert conduct
consisted of the Information, which charged "Bryan O. Rasmussen aka Brian
Anderson" and "Michael Chad Hoffman aka Michael C. Watkins Chad Schmidt"
as defendants.
(R. 8-12.) The state cited to the Information as
evidence of Cheeney's alleged "confession." (Br. Appellee at 20.) In
so doing, the state overlooked the fact that while Cheeney entered the
conditional plea in this matter only in connection with the "Sundance
Institute" burglary and theft (R. 27-36), he specifically disavowed in
(continued...)
12

supra.)

In dealing with that issue, the state suggests Cheeney's

reference to the legislative history is inappropriate, because
the phrase, "in concert,"
puts normally intelligent persons on adequate notice of
the conditions that will trigger the enhancement.
Because the statute is unambiguous on its face, it is
unnecessary and improper to use legislative history to
interpret it. The statute plainly enhances penalties
for crimes committed "in concert" with others. Nothing
more (and nothing less) may be read into it.
(Br. Appellee at 20.)
three reasons.

The state's position is incorrect for

First, the phrase "in concert" is ambiguous: (1)

the state urges this Court to interpret Section 76-3-203.1 as a
strict liability statute, although neither the plain language nor

4

(...continued)
his alleged "confession" that those offenses were committed in concert
with two or more other persons. According to the Information, Cheeney
allegedly confessed to the following: "After being informed of his
constitutional rights and freely agreeing to speak without an attorney
present, defendant Cheeney admitted to all of the above conduct and that
defendant Rasmussen had been involved with him. Defendant Cheeney also
admitted that defendant Hoffman was involved in all but the Sundance
Institute burglary and theft."
(R. 12 (emphasis added).) Criminal
informations are not evidence, and if put to the admissibility test,
would suffer multiple hearsay and reliability problems. Further, Cheeney
and Rasmussen did not enter pleas of guilty on the same burglary and
theft charges. Even if they had, the state is still one actor short of
showing "action with two or more persons" on those charges. Fully
marshaled, there is insufficient evidence to support imposition of the
gang enhancement here. The record fails to support that Cheeney and two
others committed the underlying offenses "in concert".
In addition, as a condition of the plea agreement, in exchange for
Cheeney's acknowledgment that all elements of the specifically-pled
charges were satisfied, the state agreed that Cheeney could challenge the
statute under numerous constitutional provisions, including the due
process provision of the federal constitution. The trial court accepted
the conditional plea.
The state's claim that Cheeney now has "no
complaint" under the void-for-vagueness analysis, or that he failed to
run the full course of trial and sentencing to show that the statute was
unconstitutional "as applied" against him, is inconsistent with State v.
Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Rule ll(i), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The Sery plea preserved the issues for appeal. The
state cannot in good faith be allowed to disregard the agreement and redefine the appealable issues. (See Point V, infra.)
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the legislative history of the statute support such an
interpretation; and (2) the phrase "in concert" supports the
determination that the state must establish a culpable mental
state, but fails to identify the level of culpability that must
be proved before the enhancement may be applied. (See Point I,
supra-)

Since the phrase "in concert" as used in § 76-3-203.1 is

facially vague, it is proper to consider legislative intent.
Second, even if the language of Section 76-3-203.1 was
clear, the statute must be construed in accordance with
legislative intent.
The fundamental consideration which transcends all
others in regard to the interpretation and application
of a statute is: What was the intent of the
legislature?" All other rules of statutory
construction are subordinate to it and are helpful only
insofar as they assist in attaining that objective. In
determining that intent the statute should be
considered in the light of the purpose it was designed
to serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if
that can be done consistent with its language.
Johnson v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah 1966)
(footnote and cites omitted); Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County,
568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977); accord Cullum v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange, 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993) ("A court's primary
responsibility in interpreting a statute 'is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature,' [ ] , and rules of statutory
interpretation exist only to assist in this determination");
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984) ("This
Court's primary responsibility in construing legislation is to
give effect to the intent of the legislature"); Young v. Barney,
433 P.2d 846, 847 (Utah 1967) ("In any inquiry concerning the
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application of a rule or a statute to a given situation the
primary objective is to discover the intent and purpose for which
it was enacted").
Indeed, the literal language of § 76-3-203.1 must give way
to the unequivocally expressed intent of the legislature.

This

Court has noted:
[flO]ne of the fundamental rules of statutory
construction is that the statute should be looked at as
a whole and in light of the general purpose it was
intended to serve; and should be so interpreted and
applied as to accomplish that objective. In order to
give the statute the implementation which will fulfill
its purpose, reason and intention sometimes prevail
over technically applied literalness.["] Andrus v.
Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (1965).
State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Church
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892),
the United States Supreme Court held:
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit nor within the intention
of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the
Reports are full of cases illustrating its application.
This is not the substitution of the will of the judge
for that of the legislator; for frequently words of
general meaning are used in a statute, words broad
enough to include an act in question, and yet a
consideration of the whole legislation, or of the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the
absurd results which follow from giving such broad
meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe
that the legislator intended to include the particular
act.
The Supreme Court was interpreting a statute which read:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, company,
partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever,
to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or
encourage the importation or migration, of any alien or
aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United
States, its territories, or the District of Columbia,
under contract or agreement, parol or special, express
15

or implied, made previous to the importation or
migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or
foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in
the United States, its territories, or the District of
Columbia.
Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458.

Despite the plain

language of the statute, the Court held it inapplicable to the
church, which had arranged for the transport of an Englishman to
serve as rector and pastor at a church in New York City.

The

legislative history made clear that "the intent of congress was
simply to stay the influx of this cheap, unskilled labor."

Id.

at 465; in accord. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); National R. R. Passenger Corp. v.
National Ass'n of R. R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974)
("[E]ven the most basic general principles of statutory
construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative
intent"); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534
(1940):
Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did
not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable
one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the
legislation as a whole' [] this Court has followed that
purpose, rather than the literal words.[] When aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the
statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule
of law' which forbids its use,[] however clear the
words may appear on 'superficial examination.'"
Id. at 543-4 1064 (footnotes and cites omitted); Harrison v.
Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943) (" [T]here is wisely
no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative
history no matter how 'clear the words may appear on "superficial
examination"'"); see also Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); United States v. Universal
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C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952) ("Instead of balancing
the various generalized axioms of experience in construing
legislation, regard for the specific history of the legislative
process that culminated in the Act now before us affords more
solid ground for giving it appropriate meaning").
Third, in support of its position concerning legislative
history, the state cites to Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844,
850 n. 14 (Utah 1994), which concerns the use of legislative
history in construing constitutional provisions.

In this matter,

Cheeney is not seeking simple interpretation of Section 76-3203.1.

See Kearns-Tribune Corp. and KUTV v. Hornak, Case No.

960265 (Utah May 7, 1996).

Rather, Cheeney is leveling a

constitutional challenge against the statute.

Courts

traditionally review the legislative history of statutes
challenged on vagueness and due process grounds.

See U.S. v.

Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Information
Providers7 Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v.
F.C.C., 928 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991).
In this matter, the undisputed underlying intent of Section
76-3-203.1 is that the statute applies only to criminal street
gang members acting in concert.
86.)

(Br. Appellant at 10-11; R. 77-

Since the language of the statute obscures the gang-related

purpose, Section 76-3-203.1 fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know that such conduct
is prohibited.
ambiguity.

The statute suffers from an added layer of

Thus, even if the "in concert" provision is more

clearly defined to include a culpable mental state, the statute
17

has not attained its true intent and purpose.
B. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTION, CHEENEY IS NOT
COMPLAINING ABOUT JUDICIAL DISCRETION, BUT CHALLENGES
THE STATUTE BECAUSE IT FAILS TO GUIDE JUDGES IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE LAW (NOT THE SENTENCE).
The state incorrectly claims, "[Cheeney] asserts that the
statute grants too much discretion to sentencing judges."
Appellee at 21.)

(Br.

Cheeney is not challenging the trial court's

discretion in the discreet area of post-conviction sentencing -Cheeney is challenging the capricious, discriminatory and
arbitrary manner in which trial courts may apply the law to
determine who (of the pool of like-minded convicted felons) may
be subjected to an enhanced penalty and who (of that same pool)
will be sentenced under the provisions only of the underlying
offense.

The difference is not one of discretion, but of

discrimination.
The state asserts that the statute "cabins" the "judge's
discretion by creating a strong presumption that once the 'in
concert' condition is found to exist, the enhancement will
apply."

(Br. Appellee at 22.)

That assertion begs a series of

questions -- How does the judge apply the law to determine the
predicate crime was conducted "in concert"? Does the judge apply
a bright line test or a strict liability standard, or require
proof of "common design", "plan" or "purpose", and what is the
standard of proof?

Will the judge focus on gang members as

intended by the legislature, and if so, how will the judge ferret
out others?

The courts are given large nets with multitudes of

choices inviting arbitrary and capricious application of the
18

statute.

(See Br. Appellant at 25-28.)

C. THE AMBIGUITY CREATED BY THE PHRASE "IN CONCERT"
CONDUCT DIRECTLY IMPAIRS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
PARTICULARLY IF THE COURT EMPLOYS A STRICT LIABILITY
STANDARD TO ITS APPLICATION.
The state has misconstrued that portion of Cheeney's initial
brief concerning the manner in which Section 76-3-203.1 impairs
First Amendment rights of association.

(Br. Appellee at 23.)

Cheeney acknowledged in his brief that citizens do not have the
right to assemble to commit crimes.

(Br. Appellant at 28.)

Cheeney is not advocating for that right.
As set forth in Cheeney's initial brief, because Section 763-203.1 contains vague terms, the statute serves to chill the
exercise of First Amendment rights.

The state has asked this

Court to "reject Cheeney's argument" that "proof burdens are
required" under Section 76-3-203.1, and to rule that the
prosecutor is not required to show "in concert" conduct with
circumstantial or actual evidence of the defendant's culpability.
Under such a strict liability standard, the mere existence of two
other persons in the vicinity of the crime would satisfy the
bright line test and subject the defendant to an enhanced penalty
for the predicate offense.

Application of such a standard is

inconsistent with Utah law and creates an unconstitutional
presumption.
79.

See Elton, 680 P.2d at 727; McFarland, 241 U.S. at

Such a presumption fuels the proposition that Section 76-3-

203.1 violates First Amendment freedoms of association, since a
defendant, who has committed one of the predicate crimes but
never intended or believed that his friends or associates were
19

likewise involved in the act, may be subjected to an enhanced
penalty because of his mere association with others.
POINT III. THE STATE IMPROPERLY SEEKS TO SHIFT THE
BURDEN ON THE DEFENDANT IN A PRELIMINARY HEARING
CONCERNING §76-3-203.1 ISSUES.
The state claims that Cheeney's argument under Art. I, sec.
13 of the Utah Constitution was "affirmatively waived."
Appellee at 8, 17-19.)

(Br.

Even if Cheeney originally waived the

preliminary hearing issues, the trial court's action in
addressing the issue on the merits revives the claim.

State v.

Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) ("Because the court
considered the alleged error rather than finding it waived,
Seale's right to assert the issue on appeal was resuscitated"),
cert, denied, 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993); State v. Belcrard, 830 P.2d
264, 266 (Utah 1992); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah
1991); State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991).
Cheeney's argument concerning Art. I, sec. 13 is contained
in the Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement (R. 4 0-48), and the
state's opposition on the merits is in the record at 54.
Further, the trial court denied the Motion to Strike Gang
Enhancement "for the reasons specified in the opposing
memorandum."

(R. 71 and 54.)

No waiver has occurred.

In addition, in exchange for Cheeney's guilty plea on the
burglary and theft counts, the state specifically agreed that
Cheeney could appeal the constitutionality of Section 76-3-203.1.
(R. 36.)

Cheeney relied in good faith on the representations

made by the state as set forth in the plea agreement.
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Cheeney

maintained his end of the bargain, pled to the charges and
elements as required under the agreement, and is serving his
sentence in the Utah State Prison as a result of the plea
agreement.

The state cannot be permitted to re-define the

appealable issues and should be required to abide by the terms of
the plea agreement.
With respect to the state's assertion that "the statute
appears to allow an 'in concert' inquiry at [a] preliminary
hearing" (Br. Appellee at 18), such an "appearance" is
sufficiently unclear so as to raise vagueness and ambiguity
concerns.

In addition, the state suggests that the defendant has

the opportunity at the preliminary hearing to make an "in
concert" inquiry, thereby satisfying Art. I, sec. 13.

(Id.)

The

state attempts to shift the burden on the defendant of raising
the issues that are subject to examination by the magistrate at
the preliminary hearing.
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(1).

Such burden shifting is inappropriate.
Defendants cannot be expected or

required to raise and then disprove in a preliminary hearing the
elements of the offense charged by the state.

In order for the

state to proceed with charges against a defendant the state must
make an adequate probable cause showing that passes constitutional muster.
POINT IV. CHEENEY IS NOT SEEKING "DEVELOPMENT" OF THE
UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS PROVISION OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION SINCE UTAH COURTS HAVE ALREADY DEFINED THE
APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES.
Again, the state has asserted Cheeney's arguments under
specific constitutional provisions, particularly Art. I, sec. 24,
21

were waived.

(Br. Appellee at 24.)

As set forth in Point III,

above, any waiver by Cheeney was revived in connection with the
Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement.

(R. 40-48.)

In a memorandum

to the trial court to uphold the constitutionality of Section 763-203.1, the prosecutor in this matter disavowed concerns with
the statute under the federal equal protection provision and the
state uniform operation of laws provision.

The prosecutor stated

that selective enforcement of criminal laws does not violate
constitutional principles unless it is shown that the process was
"deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification" (R. 51); and
advocated the utilization of the "rational relationship" analysis
defined in Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 582 (Utah 1993), a case
reviewed under Art. I, sec. 24.

(R. 52 and 53.)

Thereafter, the

trial court denied the Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement "for the
reasons specified in the opposing memorandum" (R. 71), thereby
preserving equal protection and Art. I, sec. 24 issues for appeal
purposes.
Consistent with Lee and Utah's Art. I, sec. 24 cases,
Cheeney has asked this Court to review Section 76-3-203.1 under
developed state constitutional principles.

(Br. Appellant at 37-

44); see Lee, 867 P.2d at 582; State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 398
(Utah 1989) (strict scrutiny test is used if a challenged
classification is "suspect" or if a "fundamental interest" is
involved); Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 356,
358 (Utah 1989); Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984)
(under Art. I, sec. 24, classifications "must be based on
22

differences that have a reasonable

tendency

to further the

objectives of the statute").
With respect to the state's claim that Cheeney's Art. I,
sec. 24 argument fails because he relies upon false premises, as
set forth above, the state is incorrect.

Among other things, the

state asserts a strict liability standard applies to Section 763-203.1.
intent.

In addition, the statute is not true to its legislative
Strict-liability application of the statute, without

consideration for the legislative intent, is unconstitutional and
impedes First Amendment freedoms of association.

Since First

Amendment rights are "fundamental rights", the statute must be
analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard as set forth in
Cheeney's initial brief.

(Br. Appellant at 40-41.)

The state

fails to oppose Cheeney's analysis under that standard.

Rather,

the state asserts the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.

Since the state interest identified

by the legislative history has no relation to the statute, the
state's argument rings hollow.

(See Br. Appellant at 30, 42-44.)

POINT V. THE ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL ARE PROPERLY
BEFORE THIS COURT.
Finally, the state has peppered its brief with additional
general and specific allegations that Cheeney has "waived" his
constitutional challenges to Section 76-3-203.1, and cannot
assert the challenges because he has not proved that the statute
was unconstitutional as applied against him.
7.)

(Br. Appellee at 6,

By those assertions, the state suggests the conditional plea

agreement is not in force, that Cheeney was required to proceed
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with the guilt phase of a trial, then follow with insufficient
sentencing procedures since Section 76-3-203.1 denies a defendant
adequate due process, in order to preserve the issues raised in
this appeal.
In this case, the nature of the conditional plea agreement,
which was accepted by the trial court, was such that Cheeney
reasonably believed the constitutional challenges were preserved
for purposes of this appeal.

(R. 27-36.)

The state should be

estopped from attacking Cheeney7s challenges on waiver and "as
applied" grounds, specifically where the issues in question were
raised to the trial court by Cheeney and the state in connection
with the Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Cheeney respectfully requests that
this Court strike the gang enhancement statute as being
unconstitutional.
SUBMITTED this <3/^L

day of

<^ZLu^^

, 1996.

LINDA M. JONES
/
U
REBECCA HYDE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM 1

APPENDIX C
UNIFORM FINE/BAIL SCHEDULE
NARRATIVE EXPLANATION OF SCHEDULE.
CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT.
GENERAL DISPOSITION MATRIX — FELONIES.
GENERAL DISPOSITION MATRLX — MISDEMEANORS.
SURCHARGE CHART.
UNIFORM FINE/BAIL SCHEDULE.
Chapter I. Traffic Violations.
Chapter II. Criminal Violations.
Chapter HI. Wildlife Resources Violations.
Chapter IV. Boating/Parks and Recreation Violations.
Chapter V. Common Motor Carrier Violations.
Overload Bail Schedule.
Compiler's Notes. — Former Appendix C,
Utah State Courts Personnel Policies and Pro-

cedures, has been deleted as an appendix to
this Code.

UNIFORM FINE/BAIL SCHEDULE
PURPOSE:
It is the intent of the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule to provide assistance to the
sentencing judge in determining the appropriate Cine or bail to be assessed in
a particular case and to minimize disparity of fines/bails imposed by different
courts for similar offenses. This schedule is not intended to deprive nor minize
the authority of the court to impose a sentence deemed just in the discretion of
the judge.
ASSUMPTIONS:
The penalty for all public offenses should include a financial sanction as a
minimum base from which the judge may determine the total sentence, dependent upon aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances of an individual
case.
The cumulative effect of appropriate penalties such as probation, community
service, surcharges, restitution, victim reparation, rehabilitation treatment
programs, home confinement, court costs and periods of incarceration, should
constitute the total sentence.
The enhancement or reduction to the basic fine should reflect the severity of
the offense, the extent of victim injury or property damage loss, the risk which
the offender poses to society, the offender's criminal and person history, and
related factors. (Specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances are set
forth on pages C and D.)
APPLICATION:
Use of Bail/Fine Columns.
The bail column is used only to set bail to ensure defendant's appearance.
The fine column is used if the defendant is convicted either through trial,
guilty plea, or voluntary forfeiture of bail (in those cases where bail forfeiture
disposes of the case).
Surcharge.
63-63a-l, U.C.A. provides that "A surcharge shall be paid on all criminal
fines, penalties and forfeitures imposed by the courts. The surcharge shall be
85% upon conviction of a felony, class A misdemeanor, violation of Article 5,
Chapter 6, Title 41, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless Driving, or any
class B misdemeanor not classified within Title 41, including violation of
1224
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comparable county or municipal ordinances. The surcharge shall be 35% upon
conviction of any offense, including violation of county or municipal ordinances not subject to the 85% surcharge, except:
(a) nonmoving traffic violations; and
(b) when the court orders the offender to perform community service
work in lieu of paying a fine."
No surcharge should be imposed in non-moving traffic offenses. If an offense
is considered "non-moving," this is indicated in the "comments" column. The
Uniform Fine/Bail Committee has the responsibility to define which offenses
are moving and which are non-moving. They have established definitions as
follows: Moving violations involve an act or omission dealing with the actual
driving of the motor vehicle, e.g.: failure to yield, speeding. Non-moving violations encompass status or conditions of the vehicle or driver license violations,
e.g.: not registered, not licensed, broken equipment.
If the fine column indicates a dollar amount, that amount INCLUDES the
appropriate surcharge. Do not add any additional surcharge.
If the fine column indicates "see matrix," the judge should refer to the
matrix on page G for misdemeanors and on page F for felonies. The dollar
amounts in the matrix DO NOT INCLUDE any surcharge. An 85% surcharge
should be added to any fine imposed from the matrix.
See charts starting on page H to assist in figuring the surcharge.
Application to Adults/Juveniles.
Since bail is not an option to a Utah juvenile, the juvenile portion of the
schedule is the suggested FINE for that offense. The Juvenile Court does
allow a youth, for some minor offenses, with the consent of his/her parent or
guardian, to post the fine by mail without appearing. Also, by Juvenile Court
rule, probation officers who conduct preliminary inquiries of new cases, can
allow youth to pay a fixed sum to the court in lieu of a petititon being filed and
a court hearing, if the facts of the case are admitted and both the parents and
youth consent to the arrangement. (Rule of Judicial Administration 7-301)
This schedule should serve as the parameter within which these actions are
taken.
If no amount is indicated on the juvenile schedule, the amount indicated on
the adult schedule should be used.
"Comments" apply to both the adult and juvenile schedule.
General Disposition Matrices.
The felony matrix and misdemeanor matrix are guidelines for setting FINE
after adjudication of a case requiring a mandatory appearance. The matrices
include a broad range of fines from the statutory maximum to a base minimum within each category of offense. They are to be used in conjunction with
the criminal history assessment criteria, which are listed below. From the
base financial sanction in each category, the schedules provide an escalation
of the fine in correlation with the points accumulated in the criminal history
criteria. The matrices also specify where incarceration is likely to be appropriate in addition to the fine. Presentence investigation reports prepared by
Adult Probation and Parole Division will include the criminal history data
necessary to place the defendant's case on the matrix.
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
Aggravating Circumstances.
Consider aggravating circumstances only if they are not an element of the
offense.
1. Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct.
2. Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior.
3. Victim was particularly vulnerable.
4. Injury to person or property was unusually extensive.
5. Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity.
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6. There were multiple charges or victims.
7. Offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less restrictive setting.
8. Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest.
9. Other (specify)
.
Mitigating Circumstances.
1. Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious
harm.
2. Offender acted under strong provocation.
3. There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal behavior, though failing to establish a defense.
4. Offender is young.
5. Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other crimes.
6. Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration.
7. Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision.
8. Crime victim does not want defendant to be incarcerated.
9. Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family relationships.
10. Imprisonment or amount of fine would entail excessive hardship on
offender or dependents.
11. Other (specify)

CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT
The attached criminal disposition matrix classifies a person's criminal history in 5 categories from excellent (0-3 points), good (4-7 points), moderate
(8-11 points), fair (12-15 points) and poor (16-28 points). The appropriate classification is determined by scores obtained by summing points assessed in
each of the six criteria as follows:
1. Prior Felony Conviction(s); up to 8 points if a person has more than 3
felony convictions.
2. Prior Misdemeanor Conviction(s); up to 4 points if a person has more
than 7 misdemeanor convictions.
3. Prior Juvenile Referrals; up to 4 points if the person was committed
to a secure facility or 3 points if the collection of felonies and misdemeanors exceeded 4 counting felonies as 1 and misdemeanors as Vs.
4. Supervision History; up to 4 points depending on the prior level of
supervision in either the juvenile or adult system and revocation history.
5. Supervision Risk; up to 4 points based on previous reporting, absconding or escape history.
6. Weapons Enhancement; up to 4 points based on the use of weapons.
Total possible points are 28, least possible 0. Aggravating and mitigating
circumstances are also a part of the sentence and release guidelines.

